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Abstract 
 
In this brief reply to Ashley’s rebuttal concerning the gatekeeping of hormone 
replacement therapy (HRT) for transgender people, we address some of the 
criticisms made of our original response to Ashley. We first re-examine 
Ashley’s attempted analogy between abortion and HRT for gender dysphoria 
and find it wanting. Our argument that it is reasonable to regard cosmetic 
surgery and HRT for gender dysphoria as comparable (including in terms of 
prior psychological assessment) is restated to show that Ashley’s previous 
objection to it is insubstantial. Our objection to Ashley’s simultaneous 
rejection of the traditional informed consent model while maintaining its 
language, and thus relying on its positive connotations rather than argument, 
is then clarified. Finally, we scrutinise the data on which rests Ashley’s claim 
that informed consent without assessment always yields positive outcomes, 
finding this conclusion to be overstated. 
Introduction 
 
Ashley has responded to our response to ‘Gatekeeping HRT for transgender 
patients is dehumanising’.​1–3​ ​Ashley criticises some of our objections to their 
view that patients seeking HRT for gender dysphoria should not have to 
undergo a prior psychological assessment.​1​ Here, we clarify our objections, 
most importantly that concerning the parity between cosmetic surgery and 
the sort of intervention Ashley has in mind, showing that Ashley's criticism of 
our comparison is insubstantial. We start, however, by examining Ashley's 
comments regarding the analogy between abortion and HRT.After revisiting 
the subject of cosmetic surgery, we consider Ashley's use of the language of 
informed consent. We close by scrutinising the data on which Ashley relies to 
defend the claim that informed consent without assessment always yields 
positive outcomes, finding this conclusion to be overstated. Finally, even if 
Ashley’s arguments were vindicated, the claim that the gatekeeping of HRT is 
motivated by hostility towards transgender people remains unsupported. 
Abortion and assessment 
 
Ashley objects to our calling their analogy between HRT for gender dysphoria 
and abortion strained, arguing that we have not explained why it is such.​3​ ​We 
maintain that the analogy is strained and consequently undermines Ashley’s 
objective. In arguing that neither pregnancy nor being transgender is an 
illness, Ashley likens abortion to interventions such as HRT—interventions 
which Ashley believes should not require prior psychological assessment. 
Yet, there are typically numerous restrictions surrounding abortion, and, 
importantly for Ashley’s argument, some sort of psychological assessment is 
often a condition for the abortion to be authorised--for example, the referring 
doctor must believe that continuing the pregnancy will have a negative effect 
on the mother’s mental health. Hence, Ashley’s analogy is strained; abortion 
is different to their proposed model of transition-related interventions. Indeed, 
so different is abortion that invoking it seemingly reinforces the importance of 
psychological assessment, thus undermining Ashley’s thesis. If, then, Ashley 
believes that induced abortion should no longer be subject to psychological 
assessment, then an argument should be made to this effect. 
Cosmetic surgery and stigma 
 
While acknowledging some similarities between cosmetic surgery and HRT 
for gender dysphoria, Ashley is unconvinced these have any bearing on 
transition-related interventions. Ashley draws attention to several possible 
differences between the two which ‘may all amount to morally relevant 
differences’.​3​ ​Less hesitantly, Ashley adds that a significant moral difference 
is that people who undergo psychological assessments for cosmetic surgery 
‘are not stigmatised and pathologised in the way trans people are’. The 
argument is that people with gender dysphoria should not undergo a 
psychological assessment prior to transition-related interventions because 
they are stigmatised and pathologised. 
This is a curious claim. Is it not likely that some people seeking cosmetic 
surgery feel and/or are stigmatised for their appearance? More importantly, 
why is this decisive? If, hypothetically, people with a cleft chin were 
stigmatised, and having such a chin came to be regarded as a medical 
problem to solve, why would this alone change the need for prior 
psychological assessment—let alone be dehumanising? Just because, for 
example, teenage pregnancy is stigmatised does not entail that women 
bearing such pregnancies are, therefore, dehumanised by undergoing a 
psychological assessment prior to an abortion. 
Notwithstanding, we wonder if Ashley would support psychological 
assessment prior to HRT ​if society became wholly accepting of gender 
dysphoria​, thus removing this factor from the equation. We speculate that 
Ashley would not, and so question the relevance of the appeal to stigma and 
medicalisation, which is the only concrete objection Ashley makes to our 
suggestion of parity between assessment for cosmetic surgery and 
transition-related interventions. Our previous point, therefore, that because 
HRT and cosmetic surgery are analogous, and cosmetic surgery is often 
preceded by psychological assessment, it is ​prima facie​ reasonable to treat 
HRT in the same manner. [​Footnote​ ] 1
The ‘informed consent’ model 
 
We believe Ashley has mischaracterised our criticism of their arguments 
concerning the informed consent model, which may be due in part to a lack 
of clarity in our first response. Ashley’s rebuttal helpfully underlines that they 
are deliberately moving away from the medical model. It thereby becomes 
clear that when Ashley is talking about ‘informed consent’, they do not mean 
it in the conventional sense, which presupposes a prior assessment (as per 
the medical model). Ashley is critical of our apparent failure to understand 
this: ‘it is peculiar for Saad, Blackshaw, and Rodger to criticise me for 
adopting a model that is not compatible with the standard medical model’.​3 
1 It is worth pointing out that there are other examples of where prior psychological assessment is 
recommended and considered routine prior to receiving treatment. One such example is bariatric 
surgery, which involves individuals who experience stigmatisation.7 The purpose of the psychological 
evaluation is to assess the patient’s ability to manage the preoperative and postoperative demands of 
the surgery on account of the high prevalence of psychiatric morbidity in this population.8 9 
This interpretation, however, misses our central criticism which, we admit, we 
did not adequately clarify. Our concern is that, while arguing for a paradigm 
shift in the management of gender dysphoria, Ashley persists in using the 
language of the rejected medical model, and thus benefits from the positive 
connotations that ‘informed consent’ has in its commonly understood 
context. Hence, it is not necessary to marshal a positive argument for 
Ashley’s alternative model; the cachet of informed consent in the traditional 
model replaces an argument. Therefore, while we are acutely aware of 
Ashley’s rejection of the medical model, we object that Ashley (and others) 
persist in using the language of the medical model, which they reject without 
making this strategy explicit. 
Evaluating the evidence for the ‘informed consent’ 
model 
 
Ashley notes in the original article and response that they provided two 
sources to support their claims that the informed consent model without prior 
assessment has yielded good outcomes.​3​ ​Whether this conclusion is fully 
supported by the evidence Ashley cites is what we question. For instance, 
Ashley backs up the claim by citing a study by Madeline Deutsch.​4​ ​However, 
4 of the 12 sites surveyed in this study required patients to have input from a 
mental health provider, and, furthermore, 5 sites surveyed required a certain 
number of consultations prior to beginning HRT—which could also be 
construed as a kind of gatekeeping. This hardly seems to support the claim 
that prior psychological assessment is unnecessary, unethical and rooted in 
‘unconscious hostility towards trans lives and experiences’.​1​ ​It seems 
uncharitable to ascribe ill motive to healthcare professionals who practice 
and apply the medical model—a model that is still recommended under the 
World Professional Association for Transgender Health ​Standards of Care​.​5 
Moreover, 7 of the 12 sites surveyed had been practicing the ‘informed 
consent model’ for less than 5 years. At one of those sites, 6% (n=10) of the 
patients were known to have expressed regret about HRT. The survey, 
however, only recorded ​known​ cases of regret and this was dependent on 
the sites’ awareness and documentation or reporting of regret. It is, therefore, 
possible that regret was underreported. Regardless, even the lowest 
estimates of regret disprove Ashley’s original claim that ‘…studies have 
shown no adverse outcomes associated with the informed consent model’.​1 
Ashley’s second source is a poster describing a retrospective chart review of 
the outcomes of patients aged 13–17 who accessed HRT using the ‘informed 
consent model’.​6​ ​The limitations of the study detailed in the poster are clear: 
the sample size was small (n=88), there are no details of a pilot test being 
undertaken and there was no comparison group. Although no adverse 
outcomes were recorded, as we argued in our first reply, it is premature and 
imprudent to remove all requirements for referral and assessment based on 
such limited evidence. 
Conclusion 
 
We hope that this response clarifies some of the points of contention 
between ours and Ashley’s respective viewpoints. We believe we have shown 
that abortion does not set a precedent for interventions for non-pathological 
states without prior psychological assessment, and that Ashley’s objection to 
our view that there is parity between HRT and cosmetic surgery is 
insubstantial. In revising the use of Ashley’s ‘informed consent’ terminology, 
we clarified our concern that the positive connotations that such language 
has within the traditional model are giving Ashley’s argument borrowed 
validity. We also examined some of the data Ashley’s claims rely on and 
found Ashley’s conclusions to be overdrawn. Finally, even if the arguments all 
stood up to scrutiny, Ashley still would have no evidentiary grounds to 
attribute ill motive to those who practise gatekeeping. It is vital that the open 
discourse needed to address so new and important an issue is not hindered 
by this sort of unfounded accusation. 
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